

# FILE COPY RETURN TO ROOM 361

Monsieur le President,

The Japanese Delegation has laid before the Council of the League of Nations, the Observations their Government have thought proper to make regarding the Report of the Commission of Enquiry. We consider that the Report, taken as a whole, and especially in its descriptive accounts, furnishes a valuable picture of events. There are passages and even whole sections with which the Japanese Government are entirely in accord. We highly appreciate the earnest and arduous labours of the Commission, and we wish, first of all, to extend to the distinguished Members, collectively and individually our sincere appreciation and thanks.

We owe it to candour, however, to state that the Report has not been as full or as proper in many of its deductions and conclusions as a longer study of the problem would have produced. We have, therefore, taken pains to draft certain Observations for the consideration of the Council, and we hope that these will be carefully examined and fully weighed.

The condition of China is described at length in the Report, but a somewhat optimistic and hopeful attitude is taken which, we regret to say, we are unable to share.

The Commission take us Japanese to task for having shared in the "altogether different attitude which was taken at the time of the Washington Conference", when, "there existed no fewer than three governments professing to be independent, not to mention the autonomous status of a number of provinces or parts of provinces". At the time of the Washington Conference, in 1922, although conditions in China were not ideal, it was possible for us to join with other Powers in hoping for a restoration of unity and peace, and we gladly did so. We knew that conditions were worse than they had been ten years before, when the Republic was proclaimed, but we hoped for improvement. Now, another decade has passed, and conditions are not better but worse.

There is now a kaleidoscope of rival military leaders, usually called War Lords. Outer Mongolia has become sovietized; Thibet is at war with China; Turkestan is almost entirely cut off from contact with the nominally sovereign state; the National Government is in control by military force of only the several provinces about the mouth of the Yangtze River; Shantung is suffering from another conflict of military leaders; Szechuan is in disorder; the faction at Canton is independent and hostile; and, as the Commission reports, there is "menace from another source, namely Communism".

At the time of the Washington Conference, there was not threat of Communism in China. That was taken into the country by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1925. With assistance in the way of arms, money, military experts and trained propagandists from Russia, the renowned revolutionary leader was able to organize the Nationalist movement; and when he died, General Chiang Kai-shek assumed the leadership. The General disagreed with his Russian associates and drove them out of the country; and today he is fighting the Communist movement carried on by Chinese leaders, particularly in the provinces of Hupel, Fukien and Kiangsi, - that is to say, the heart of China. But the National Government, of which General Chiang is the chief, and the Kuomintang Party, which supports it, have not given up the principles which caused the various foreign Governments, a few years ago, to increase their garrisons at Shanghai.

Foreign troops - European and American as well as Japanese - have been stationed in China for more than thirty years, and foreign naval vessels have been patrolling the Yangtze River for a similar length of time. These foreign forces are kept there not only for the protection of their respective nationals who may venture beyond the beaten tracks of trade and travel but to protect even the foreign legations at the old capital, Peking (now Peiping), and the new capital, Nanking.

Is it not an extraordinary state of affairs when the lives of Ministers Plenipotentiary, accredited to a recognized government, have to be followed by troops or men-of-war for the safety of their lives? Does such a condition exist anywhere else in the world? Is the presence of foreign military and



naval forces in China, only a matter of form? I am sorry to say it is not. In 1927, it will be remembered, the foreign consulates in Nanking were attacked by officers and soldiers of a faction of the Nationalist Army, and American and British naval vessels went into action to save the lives of their consuls, and their wives and children. Nor have the attacks upon foreign merchant vessels by bandits and soldiers ceased. Particularly in the past seven years - that is to say, since the Nationalist Government decided to bring the so-called "unequal treaties" to an end, foreign naval vessels - European and American, as well as Japanese, have had numerous encounters with troops and bandit armies.

Although in normal times, our Government keeps no greater number of troops and men-of-war in China proper than the British or American Government, we have a far greater number of people to protect. The number of Japanese residing and doing business in China treaty ports is several times larger than the number of all other foreigners taken together. I mean by this statement to show that we have sought not only to use as little force as possible but to display as little.

The relations of China with foreign Powers have not been improved since radical ideas were adopted by the Kuomintang party. As the League Commission have reported, "In two particulars has this been carried so far as to contribute to the creation of an atmosphere in which the present conflict arose, namely, the use made of the economic boycott, and the introduction of anti-foreign propaganda in the schools."

"The ideas of Dr. Sun Yat-sen", says the Commission, "are now taught in the schools as if they had the same authority as that of the Classics in former centuries. The sayings of the Master receive the same veneration as the sayings of Confucius received in the days before the Revolution. Unfortunately, however, more attention has been given to the negative than to the constructive side of nationalism in the education of the young. A perusal of the text books used in the schools leaves the impression on the mind of a reader that their authors have sought to kindle patriotism with the flame of hatred, and to build up manliness upon a sense of injury. The result of this virulent anti-foreign propaganda, begun in the schools and carried through every phase of public life, has been to induce students to engage in political activities which have culminated in attacks on the persons, homes, or offices of Ministers and other authorities and in attempts to overthrow the Government."

The National Government is permeated by acute anti-foreign feeling, and works assiduously to instill a hatred of foreigners into the minds of the younger generation. Fifty millions of young Chinese are growing up under the influence of violent ideas, thus constituting a terrific problem for the immediate future.

Although the armies of China number in all over two million men, few of them are organized or intended for the defense of the country. In coping with alleged injustice on the part of foreign Powers a method other than armed resistance has often been adopted. This is the boycott, - a form of hostility contrary to commercial treaties or treaties of amity. Its results are often more protracted, worse and more difficult to deal with than what is recognized as war. It is warfare of an insidious character.

Our people in China have been tortured for many years by this practice which includes the cutting off of even daily provisions. Many have been brought to ruin. Many of our industries at home as well as in China have been seriously injured, some actually destroyed. If it were a spontaneous and natural thing, due to the dislike of us by those who buy our goods, we would have less to complain about; but it is an institution inspired and organized by the Kuomintang and even Government officials. It is utilized as an instrument of national policy to secure abandonment by a foreign Power of its treaty rights. Powers of the world have outlawed by treaty the resort to war with arms. I would ask the Council why the boycott, when it assumes an official or semi-official character, should not be condemned by the League of Nations and outlawed by it?

It is not only the Japanese who have suffered from this form of hostility. Great Britain and even the United States have been boycotted. But we, who depend more upon Chinese trade than any other nation, have, in recent years, borne the brunt of it. The Commission pointed out that "so far as Japan is



China's nearest neighbour and largest customer she has suffered more than any other Power from lawless conditions." We have suffered from boycott in spite of long and serious efforts to be on terms of amity with China. But the longer our tolerant attitude was observed, the more severe became the hostility. Our toleration was apparently mistaken by China as weakness and seemed to encourage the political factions to go further in the organization of their efforts to injure us.

As, in the course of my remarks, I must seem unavoidably to cast reflections on the conduct of the Chinese, it may be well for me to disclaim the idea, - sometimes latent in the Report, - that Japan entertains feelings of bitterness or hostility towards the Chinese people. The Japanese Government believe that the Chinese people have been much misled, much terrorised and much misrepresented, and that their main desire is to enjoy in peace and quiet the results of their industry. Japan, maintaining her old friendly attitude, looks forward to ages of prosperous and neighbourly cooperation between the two nations.

So much for the condition of China. In Manchuria to which I now turn, anti-foreign agitation was concentrated on us.

Until the death of Chang Tso-lin, the dictator in Manchuria, in 1928, this sort of agitation was not permitted there. The "old Marshal" wisely prevented it. But when his son, the "young Marshal", Chang Hsueh-liang, fell heir to his father's estate and authority, he came to terms with General Chiang Kai-shek, and permitted agents from China proper to enter Manchuria and conduct propaganda directly against Japan. All the rights which Japan had acquired in Manchuria were to be "recovered". Japanese investments in railways, mines and other enterprises, - which had been of incalculable benefit to the Chinese people, - were to be taken away. They were slowly to be tortured out of the country. Pamphlets and papers were printed and circulated, posters placarded on the walls of the cities, and speeches were made in private and public with this object in view. Propagandists, trained and experienced in anti-foreign campaigning, directed the work. The army of Chang Hsueh-liang, numbering over three hundred thousand men, were indoctrinated with the principle.

The Commission dealt at length with this campaign, saying that in its official Party publication and numerous affiliated organs, the Kuomintang never ceased to insist on the primary importance of the recovery of lost sovereign rights, and abolition of "unequal" treaties and the wickedness of imperialism. Such propaganda, the Commission continued, was bound to make a profound impression in Manchuria, where the reality of foreign interests, courts, police, guards or soldiers on Chinese soil was apparent. "Associations such as the Liaoning People's Foreign Policy Association made their appearance. They stimulated and carried on an anti-Japanese agitation. Pressure was brought to bear on Chinese house-owners and landlords to raise the rents of Japanese and Korean tenants, or to refuse renewal of rent contracts. Korean settlers were subjected to systematic persecution. Various orders and instructions of an anti-Japanese nature were issued." In April, 1931, at a Conference of the People's Foreign Policy Association, held at Mukden, "the possibility of liquidating the Japanese position in Manchuria was discussed, the recovery of the South Manchuria Railway being included in the resolutions adopted".

Japan had no intention of surrendering her rights and properties in Manchuria and had repeatedly made that fact clear. She had officially warned Chang Hsueh-liang himself and generals and civil officials under him. She had made it known also throughout the world that she regarded Manchuria as of vital importance to herself both strategically and economically, and would countenance no change in the special position she held in that territory.

She had been careful, however, to state repeatedly that she had no intention other than to preserve her own rights, acquired by treaty, and her properties. She was content to recognize the fiction of Chinese sovereignty. She was also careful to observe the international policy of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity for the trade of all nations. She displayed patience at least as great as any Western Power, similarly placed, would have done. In fact, I believe she displayed far more. But the breaking point came. Even Japanese patience, which is highly elastic, cannot be stretched indefinitely. The incident of September 18, last year, was the straw that broke the over-stretched band.



With regard to that Incident, the Commission's Report says that the damage done to the railway was not of itself sufficient to justify military action. It is true that the occurrence of the explosion, if taken only by itself, was quite insignificant. But here the Report fails to take fully into account the serious background of the situation. Had the incident occurred at another period of time, the Commission's observation might have been correct and justified. A far more serious incident, the wrecking of an express train, - unmistakably an act of Chinese soldiery, - resulting in the loss of many lives, did actually take place not far from this particular spot, several years ago, but it resulted in no developments of consequence as the tension at the time was not so great. On the occasion of September 18, 1931, however, the state of tension was much higher and the consequences that followed were grave. It must also be remembered that the explosion in this instance was followed by firing from Chinese troops.

The prompt action of our scattered military forces along the South Manchuria Railway taken even before the orders from their Headquarters reached them, may be regarded as surprising by those who do not realize the height of mutual suspicion and tension that existed and the grave risks that both the Japanese troops and the resident Japanese population were taking. Like any other organized force, that of Japan must necessarily have been prepared for any emergency. When stationed on or in the neighborhood of foreign territory, particularly when repeated occurrences show that prompt measures may become imperative, an army must be prepared with a well thought-out emergency plan. This the Japanese army had. To have failed to prepare an emergency plan would have been a distinct dereliction of duty, for our troops, only ten thousand four hundred in number, were surrounded by an army twenty times their size, equipped with airplanes and possessing a well stored arsenal, regarded as the best in China. To prevent itself from being overwhelmed, the Japanese army had to have a plan and, when once the alarm arose, its action was almost automatic. It was in fact put into operation with "swiftness and precision", as the Report has it, and properly so.

In dealing with the events of September 18 and 19, the Commission says that "the military operations of the Japanese troops during that night can not be regarded as measures of legitimate self defense". With this we can not agree.

The paragraph concerning the right of self defense contained in the note of Mr. Kellogg, Secretary of State, dated June 23, 1928, reads as follows:

"(1) Self defense. There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self defense. The right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless to treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self defense.

The Resolution adopted by the Senate of the United States at the time of ratification of that Treaty states:

"It is well understood that the exercise of the right of self protection may, and frequently does, extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the state exercising it."

Also to be cited are the letters of Sir Austen Chamberlain dated May 19 and July 18, 1928.

The first observes:

"4. After studying the wording of Article I of the United States draft, His Majesty's Government do not think that its terms exclude action which a state may be forced to take in self defense. Mr. Kellogg had made it clear in the speech which I have referred above that he regards the right of self defense as inalienable, and His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that on this question no addition to the text is necessary.....



"10. The language of Article I, as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, renders it desirable that I should remind your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government has been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self defense. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. The Government of the United States has comparable interests any disregard of which by a foreign power they have declared that they would regard as an unfriendly act. His Majesty's Government believes, therefore, that in defining their position they are expressing the intention and meaning of the United States Government."

Sir Austen Chamberlain's second letter says:

"I am entirely in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Kellogg in his speech of the 29th April that the proposed treaty does not restrict or impair in any way the right of self defense, as also with his opinion that each state alone is competent to decide when circumstances necessitate recourse to war for that purpose."

The French Government in its reply of July 14, 1929, made similar observations, as did also the German Government.

The Japanese Government, informed of all these communications, also did not fail to emphasize in their note of May 26, 1928, to the American Ambassador, that "The proposal of the United States is understood to contain nothing that would refuse to independent states the right of self defense."

In face of these express reserves, and in view of the organized hostility prevailing against our interests, our people and our forces at the time, the Japanese Government, which is the acknowledged judge in the matter, regards the action of its army as entirely one of self defense, the right to which the Pact of Paris was so explicitly understood not to question or to deny to any nation.

"Why did we not refer the matter of Manchuria to the League of Nations?" is a question that has often been asked. The answer, in brief, is first that Japanese national sentiment would not permit outside interference in the Manchurian question. Secondly, had we referred the matter to the League, the position of Japanese subjects, including Koreans, in Manchuria would have been seriously undermined, in view of the delay invariably incidental to League procedure. Thirdly, there is a difference between Japanese and Western mentality. The Westerner would begin to argue before the situation became acute, while the Japanese persists, perhaps too long, in the hope of a solution. Fourthly, when the breaking point came unexpectedly, events took their own natural course.

In regard to Manchuria, the Observations which we have presented to the Council differ materially from the Report of the Commission. We disagree with the contention that Manchuria was an integral part of China. It was distinctly and almost exclusively a Crown Domain or a private estate appanage of the Manchu Dynasty up to the beginning of the present century. And never has any of the recognized governments of China controlled it. Only on occasions, its dictator saw fit to ally himself with one or another of those governments. We have gone into this matter at some length in our Observations.

Chang Tso-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang, who together ruled Manchuria for the entire term of the Republican regime, were independent or allied with one or another faction in China entirely according to their will and interests, and no power in China Proper was ever in a position to dislodge them.

We agree entirely with the Commission in their statement that the return of Manchuria to the status quo ante would be an unsatisfactory solution. But we entirely disagree with the statement that "the maintenance and recognition of the present regime would be equally unsatisfactory." The establishment of the state of Manchukuo appears to us to be the only solution possible. It was according to this view and conviction that the Japanese Government extended formal recognition to the new State, and concluded a treaty of alliance for



the mutual protection of the two countries. Mere consideration on our part of an alternative solution might possibly lay the whole Far Eastern situation open to serious disorders. It would immediately unsettle the feeling of confidence existing in the Manchukuo Government and among the people. It would encourage further activities from China to create disorders. We can enter into no such consideration.

The question of the genuineness of the independence movement in Manchuria was raised by the Commission. The Report states that "a group of Japanese civil and military officials, both active and retired, who were in close touch with the new political movement in Japan, conceived, organized and carried through" the independence of Manchoukuo.

The statement is not correct. The new State does not owe its organization to Japanese initiative. It is due to the people's evident wish to be rid of the Changs. It had been a terrible rule, ruthless in its oppression of the people, as the Report partially shows. It was, therefore, only natural for the people to seize the opportunity for relief. It is a matter of history that this desire had led years ago to the cry of Paoching Anmin - which means "Preserve the frontiers and give us peace", or to use a more Western form "Manchuria for the Manchurians". The existence of this movement is no supposititious figment. Its leaders were perfectly well known and were highly reputable men. Two of the more prominent were officials of the Chang Government, both of whom had to resign to give way to the War Lord's grandiose schemes of military conquest. It was Mr. Yu Chung-han, one of Chang's former counsellors, who after September 18, became the organizer of what was called the Self Government Guiding Board. And there was also a movement to restore the Manchu Dynasty in Manchuria, its cradle and its Crown Domain, this movement being as old as the Republic of China. The Report declares that prior to the Incident of September 18, idea of independence did not exist. The Commission seems to have disregarded much information supplied them on this subject. It is certainly difficult, I concede, for Westerners to detect and know some of the undercurrents connected with these movements in the Orient.

A little thought will show the error in the Commission's deduction. The Committee for the Preservation of Order in the Fengtien region was established as early as September 24, 1931, and was issuing declarations which contemplated independence on September 26. On that same date General Hsi Hsia declared the independence of the Province of Kirin. On the 27th, a committee was formed for the preservation of order at Harbin. On October 1, General Chang Hai-peng proclaimed the independence of Taonan. On October 17, General Yu Chi-shan, Commander of the Liaoning Army of Defence declared his independence, demanding the foundation of a Manchu-Mongol State with the former Manchu Emperor as its ruler. Can it be supposed that within three weeks of the Incident of September 18, the allegedly undesirable and unwanted Japanese officials, a comparative handful of men, could have scoured the country, changed its conviction and rallied it to turn against the old regime? That is too much flattery for us. It is giving us credit, for ability in the art of persuasion that we do not possess. But are not these various local movements a very telling indication of welcome? If they are not that, they are at least an indication of satisfaction and relief at the disappearance of the rule of Chang Hsueh-liang.

Both Baron Shidehara, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, and General Minami, Minister of War, issued telegraphic instructions on September 26, forbidding participation by Japanese military and civil officials and other Japanese in the various attempts already being made to establish a new political order in Manchuria.

Who was the most natural and logical chief executive for the new Government to seek? Can it be denied that this person was the rightful heir to the ancestral rulers of Manchuria? Or can it be questioned that there has long been a hope, as well as an actual movement, for the restoration of Manchu authority in North China? There has been, indeed, several attempts at a restoration of the ex-Emperor to the throne of China, and at one time, for a brief period, he was actually returned to authority in Peking.

In our Observations fuller details are set forth. We regret that the Commission seems to have been persuaded to accept the statements and arguments of Chang Hsueh-liang's group of adherents in preference to those of the Manchoukuo officials and supporters.



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While in several places, the Report expresses hope for China Proper, it expressed the contrary regarding Manchoukuo. Our opinion reverses these hopes. Already the Government of Manchoukuo, though hardly eleven months old, is functioning as a civil administration. It is the first civil administration the country has known since before the fall of the Manchu Dynasty twenty years ago.

While it is true that without the presence of the Japanese troops in Manchuria the new Government would have had difficulty in establishing itself, the question might be asked how the Nationalist Government could have been set up at Nanking without the aid of arms, men and money obtained from abroad?

In our Observations we have also given some details with regard to the progress of Manchoukuo. Beside the slow progress in China this progress is comparatively amazing. I need cite in evidence but one telling fact, namely, the value of the paper dollar of the Central Bank. The Commission's Report expresses doubt of the success of that Bank. But the fact is that its paper dollar stands already at a premium over the value of the silver dollar - a fact unprecedented in Manchurian history under the long rule of the Changs. While even, on one occasion, the summary decapitation of several prominent Chinese business men at Marshal Chang Tso-lin's command, was not a sufficient example to keep the price of his currency at par, the paper money of the present Government, as I have said, is already at a premium. I submit that this is extraordinary evidence of stability and of the confidence the people place in their Government. The Report also expresses pessimism as regards the budgetary question. But this problem also leaves no room, as facts bear out, to any reasonable apprehension. It can be seen plainly in the report of the Financial Department of Manchoukuo. It may here be added that Manchuria has been enjoying a surplus of from one to two million yen in exports over imports for more than a decade.

It is true that the suppression of outlawry and banditry has not yet been fully accomplished. Scattered remnants of the troops of the old dictator's forces are still in arms in opposition to the new Government and the Japanese forces. Banditry has been a means of livelihood and a professional business in Manchuria for scores of years, and the territory is too wide for us to expect to suppress it, in cooperation with the Manchoukuo forces, in a few months or only a year.

The present outlawry is being, to some extent, supported from China Proper for the express purpose, - there can be little doubt, - of making a demonstration of discontent before the Western World, - while at the same time special efforts are likewise being made to cover or to excuse the warfare that prevails in China.

It is unjust to make Japan responsible for what has happened in Manchuria. We did not seek the change. Had China as a whole, or even Manchuria alone, been properly governed, had the rights and interests and the lives of the Japanese people been free from deliberately destructive efforts, there would have been no change. We acted spontaneously in self defense; and when we acted, the independence movement developed spontaneously.

It is not inappropriate to recall the case of Navarino, when a conflict was so little desired or expected that one of the governments involved described it as an "untoward event". The Egyptian armament had come to assist the Turks to suppress the revolt in Greece; they were faced by a fleet of English, French and Russian vessels, which were bent on preventing them from doing so. In that state of tension, a chance shot furnished the spark that produced the conflict. The result destroyed the Egyptian fleet and Turkish hopes, and set the seal on the independence of Greece. Yet it began in mere self defense - the return of fire. This illustrates how impossible it is to limit the consequences of self defensive measures.

We might also recall the fact that the United States sent expeditions into Mexico in the years 1916 and 1917, because the Mexican Government of the time was unable to protect the lives of its people. In the case of Manchuria the authorities themselves were actually encouraging the anti-Japanese activities. We are not to be held responsible for the results. China and the independent government of Chang Hsueh-liang are themselves responsible. It was their doing, not ours, and it was done against our repeated and persistent warnings. We have violated neither the Covenant of the League, nor the Nine Power Treaty nor the Pact of Paris.



I would ask the Council to look at the record of Japan since she opened her doors, eighty years ago, to foreign intercourse. For three hundred years, a longer record than any other nation in the world, - we had had no foreign war. Subsequently we had occasion to participate in several. Have we sought in these wars anything but our own security from the menace of others? On the other hand, for how many years has the condition of China been a menace to the peace of the world and how long will it continue to be?

I ask of the Council a little patience. If the Western world will bestow upon us only a fraction of the tolerance it has so generously bestowed upon China it will be gratefully received.

The policy, the hope, the determination of my country is the maintenance of peace. We want war with no nation. We want no more territory. We are no aggressors. We desire deeply and earnestly the welfare of our great neighbour.

For decades the unhappy condition of China has been a dangerous influence while the policies of Japan have been the stabilizing and protective influence in the Far East. It would be difficult for the Japanese nation to understand the attitude of Western Powers if they should accuse us to the contrary.

In conclusion permit me, M. le President, again to express the heartfelt thanks of the Japanese Government and the Japanese Delegation to Lord Lytton and the other distinguished Members of the Commission of Enquiry, whose arduous travel and able work we sincerely and truly appreciate.



辯護局審判第一三一號

國際聯盟關係書類集よりの抄萃

第廿九乃至五〇頁一九三二年十二月

大體領 段

日本代表委員は、日本政府が調査委員會の報告に關して爲すのを適當と  
思考した見解を、國際聯盟の會議に披瀝してゐる。その報告は、全体と  
して見ると、殊に敘述の記事が事件を描いて貴重な繪を見る様であると  
我々は思ふ。日本政府が全然同意の幾章や又全部の項すらある。我々は  
委員會の眞摯にして艱勉な勞苦を益だ多とする、そして何はさて置き、  
その名だたる委員達を全体としても又個人的にも、我々は眞に多とし且  
感謝するものである。

然し率直に言ふと、その報告は、問題をもつと長く研究した時程、多く  
の推論や決論が充分でも適切でも無かつた。それ故會議の考慮を促す爲  
めに手數乍ら或る意見書を作製したよく調べて見て充分に考量されん事  
を希望する。



中國の狀態は報告中に詳しく敘述されてゐるが、我々が同意出來ない稍々樂觀的で好望的態度が其に執られてゐると云ふのを遺憾とする。

委員會は、幾つもの省や省中の一部の自治狀態は勿論の事、獨立も標榜する三つもの政府が存在した、ワシントン會議の當時の全く別な態度に我々日本人が加擔したといつて叱る。一九二二年のワシントン會議當時には、假令中國の狀態は理想的ではなかつたとは云へ、統一と平和との回復を列強と共に希望する事が我々には來た、又我々は喜んでそうした。十年前、共和國が宣言された時よりも狀態は悪くなつたが、然しよく成る事を希望した。今や更に十年間過ぎたが狀態はよく成つて居らぬ、一層悪くなつてゐる。

通例將領と呼ばれる軍事上の指導者が目下綺麗星の如く割據してゐる。外蒙はソビエツト化してゐる。チベツトは中國と戦争してゐる。トルキスタンとかの名義上の獨立國とは殆ど全く接觸してゐない。國民政府をば揚子江口附近の僅々數省の軍隊が支配してゐる。山東省はも一つの將軍達の争で苦しんでゐる。四川省は亂れてゐる。廣東派は一致せず敵視



し合つてゐる。そして委員會が報告する様に、他の方面からの即ち共産主義の脅威がある。

ワシントン會議當時には中國には共産主義の脅威は無かつた。それは一九二五年に孫逸仙博士が中國に入れたつであつた。武器、資金、軍事専門家及び訓練されたロシアの宣傳家といふ、方面の助けを待て、かの有名な革命家は國民黨運動を統一組織する事が出来た、そして彼が死んだ時蔣介石將軍が指導權を握つた。

將軍は、ロシアの相棒達と意見が合はず、國外に追出した、そして今日中國の指導者達の行ふ共産主義運動と、殊に、山西省、福建省、廣西省即ち中國の中心で戦つてゐる。然し蔣將軍が主君である國民政府及び之を支持する國民黨は、數年以前に、諸外國政府に、上海の警備隊を増兵させた主義が、捨ててゐない。

外國の軍隊即ち日本軍に歐米の軍隊は、卅數年間中國に駐屯し、外國の海軍艦船は同じ位長い間揚子江を警備して居つた。是等の外國軍は、常に商賣や旅行で歩く範圍を超えて、遠く踏み出さずかも知れない、自國民



の保護の爲めばかりでなく、首都北京（今の北平）や新都南京に於ける自國の公使館をさへ保護する爲めに置かれてゐる。

承認された政府への信任狀を與へられてゐる全權公使の生命が、その安全を圖る必要上、軍隊又は軍艦を隨行せねばならない時は、異常な事態ではないか。かかる状態が他の何處の世界にあるか。中國に、外國の陸海軍の兵が居るのは、單に形式上の事であるか。残念ながら然らずである。一九二七年に南京の外國領事館が、國民黨軍の一派の將兵に攻撃され、アメリカ及び英國の海軍艦船がその領事及び領事の妻子の生命を救ふ爲めに、軍事行動を執つたのを記憶するだらう。

又匪賊及び兵隊による、外國商船の攻撃も止まなかつた。特に過去七年の間に、即ち國民黨政府が、所謂不平等條約を終らせようと決めてから外國の海軍艦船即ち日本並に歐米の艦船は、軍隊及び艦隊軍と數多衝突してゐる。

假令平時に於てすら、我が政府は英國や米國の政府よりも中國本土に軍隊及び軍艦を少く置いてゐても、益に多くの人々を保護せねばならない。

中國の條約港に居住して商賣を營む日本人の數は、他の外國人を合計したものの數倍になつてゐる。私がこゝ言ふのは、我々は、出來るだけ少い兵力を用ゐようと努めたのみならず、又出來るだけ多く兵力を發揮しようとして圖つた事を、示す爲めである。

中國と列強との關係は、過激思想を國民黨が採用してから改營されてゐない、聯盟の委員會が報告してゐる様に、二つの事柄も經濟的ボイコットの利用と學校内に於ける排他宣傳の政入れで、國民黨は、露臺の筆を離し出した。國氣を造り出すのに與つて力がある程に、されて來てゐる委員會は「孫逸仙博士の思想は、過去の世紀の古典と同じ權威を持つてゐるかの様に學校で教えられてゐる。彼の言は革命以前の時代に、孔子の言が受けたと同じ尊敬を受けてゐる。然し不幸にも青年の教育では、國家主義の否定的方面が、建設的方面よりも注意を拂はれて來てゐる。學校で使用されてゐる教科書を熟讀すると、讀んだ人の心に、教科書の著者が憎惡の熱情を以て、愛國心を燃やそうと圖り、危害の念を土臺に其の上に男らしさを築き上げようと企ててゐるといふ印象が残る。學校



に始まり、公生活の全部面に行はれたこの有毒な排他宣傳の結果は、學生を政治活動に従事させて、遂には大臣其他當局者の身体家庭又は役所を攻撃させ、且政府を轉覆しようとして企てるに至らしめてゐる。」と云つてゐる。

國民政府には強い排他感情がしみ込んでゐて、努めて青年層の心の中に外國人憎惡の念を注入しようと勵いてゐる。中國五千萬の青年は、激しい思想の影響を受けて成長してゐるが、斯様にして直ぐの將來に發じい問題を拵へてゐるのだ。

假令中國の軍勢は全部で二百萬を超えてゐようか、國防の爲めに編成されたり、國防の積りであるものは少い。列強側で、中國が非道をしたと主張するのに、抵抗して、武力抗爭とは別の方法が屢々用ひられて來た。之はボイコットである。即ち通商條約又は和親條約に反する一種の敵對行爲である。その結果は往々戰爭と認められるものよりも、もつと長時日に亘り、もつと悪いもので、又もつと處理に困難を來すものである。それは陰險性の戰である。

我が中國在留民は、多年に亘り、日々の食糧すら絶たれる事のあるこの憤行行爲に、苦しめられて來た。多くの者は破滅せしめられた。中國に内地に於ける多くの我が産業は、重大の損害を蒙り、中には事實上破壊されたものもあつた。若し之が我が商品を買ふ者達が我々を嫌ふが爲め自發的に自然に起されたものなら、餘り苦情も云はないだらうが、然し之は、國民黨や政府の官吏さへもが鼓吹し組織した制裁である。之は外國に中國に對する條約上の權利を必ず廢棄させようとの國家政策の手段に、利用されてある。世界の列強は、條約によつて武力行使の戰爭を不法なりとして來てゐる。予は何故ボイコットが、公的又は半官的性質を帯びた時、國際聯盟によつて認められ不法なりとせられなかつたかと、委員會に尋ねて見たい。この偏敵對行爲を受けたものは日本人計りでない。英國や米國すらもボイコットされた。然し我々他の國家よりも一層支那貿易に依存する者は、近年この攻撃を受けて來てゐる。委員會は「日本が、中國の最隣人であり最大顧客である限り、他の國よりも一層不法状態に苦しんでゐる」事を指摘した。我々は、中國と和親しようとして、



く威嚇に努力したに拘らず、ボイコットされてゐる。然し我々が、寛容的態度を長く守れば守る程、敵對行爲は激しくなつて來た。我々の寛容は、表面上中國から弱さと同様はれて、その政派を鼓舞して我々を害せんとする努力の組織化を進めさせる様に見えた。

予の言の中で、予は、どうしても中國の行爲を反省させる様に見えるに違ひないので、予は、時々報告中には表はれてゐない觀念、即ち日本は中國國民に對し恨みの念又は敵意を抱いてゐるといふ觀念を、放棄するのが良いかも知れない。日本政府は、中國民は甚だ指導を誤まられ、甚だ危害を蒙り、又大ひに誤解されてゐると信ずる、而して彼等の主なる望みは、平和靜謐裡に彼等の勤勉の結果を樂むにある事を信ずる。日本は昔からの友好的態度を保持しながら、兩國家に仕合せな親隣的協力の時代が、到來せん事を期待してゐる。

日本の狀態に就いてはこれだりにする。之から轉じて説く滿洲に於ては排他的煽動運動が我々に向つて集中された。滿洲の執權張作霖が、一九二八年に死ぬ迄は、この種の煽動運動は滿洲

には許されてなかつた。この老元帥は、賢明にも之を防止してゐた。然し彼の息なる若元帥張學良が、父の財産と權威を承け繼ぐと、彼は蔣介石將軍と仲直りして、中國本土からの代理者を滿洲に入るを許し、且直接反日の宣傳を行ふを許可した。日本が滿洲に於てから得た全この權利は、回復せらる可きものであつた。日本が鐵道鑛山其他の事業にした投資は、中國民衆に計り知れない利益であつたが、取り去つて仕舞ふ可きものであつた。彼等は、徐々に買めさいなまれて、滿洲から取り去られた。小冊子や書き物が印刷されて頒布され、宣傳ビラは、都會の壁間に貼り出され、演説は之の目的で、公私とも行はれた。その他宣傳に訓練され、經驗を積んだ宣傳家が、その仕事を指導した。張學良の三十萬以上に上る軍隊は、この主義を教へ込まれた。

委員會は、この運動を詳細に論じて曰く、國民黨はその公けの出版物でも、又多數の政治的關係のある機關でも喪失した宗主權の回復が、第一に重要な事や、不平等條約の廢棄や、帝國主義の悪いこと等を主張するのを止めなかつたと。委員會は、又續けて曰く、かかる宣傳は、中



國の國土に、現に、外國の權利、裁判所、警察があり、警備兵又は軍隊が居るので明かな滿洲に於て、深奥な印象を起すに決つてゐた。遼陽人民外政協會の如き團體が現れた。彼等は排日運動運動を鼓吹し且實行した。中國人で家屋所有者や地主である者に、壓迫を加へ、日本人及び朝鮮人の借家借地人たる者の家賃地代を上げさせ、又借家借地契約の更改を拒絶させた。朝鮮人の居住者は組織的に迫害を受けた。種々排日的性質を帯びた命令や訓令が發せられた。一九三一年四月終天に開かれたかの人民外政協會の會議で、日本の滿洲に於ける地歩を解消する可能性が討議され、南滿洲鐵道の回復が、採擇された決議中に含まれて居つた。と日本は、滿洲に於ける、その權利及び財産も抛棄する意思を有しなかつた、そして繰返して其事實を明かにした。日本は、公然と張學良自身及びその部下の將軍及び文官に警告して居つた。日本は、滿洲を戰略上からも經濟上からも、樞要なりと認め、滿洲に保持する特殊の地歩の變更を、決して喜ぶものに非ずといふ事を、全世界に知らして居つた。然し日本は、條約で勝ち得た權利及び日本の財産を、保存するより他、

何等の意圖なしと言つて居つた。日本は、支那の宗主權の虚構なる事を、  
 認識すれば事足りたのであつた。日本は又、全國家の貿易に對する門戸  
 解放機會均等の國際政策を、吃緊守つて居つた。日本と同一の場合に置  
 かれた西洋諸國が哀はしたであらうものに、更に劣らぬ忍耐さを、表し  
 た。然れども破局點に立到つた。日本は、それは、更に更にもつと忍耐  
 はするが、限り無くは出來ない。昨年九月十八日の事件は一觸即發の導  
 火線であつた。

その事件に關して、委員會の報告は、鐵道になされた損害其のものは、  
 何も軍事行動を起す程のもので無かつたと云つてゐる。成程それだけを  
 考へれば、爆發が起つたといふ事は全く大した事でない。然し是處で報  
 告は、事態の重大なる背景を充分考慮に入れる事をせずにある。事件が  
 他の時に起されたのであつたなら、委員會の見解は間違ひなく正當とさ  
 れたであらう。遂に重大な事件で、紛ふ方なく中國兵が行つた、急行列  
 車を破壊して多數人命を奪つた事が、數年前に、この現場から遠くない  
 所で起つたが、その時は、そんなに緊迫した時勢でなかつたので、何等



重大な進展をせず終つた。然し一九卅一年九月十八日の場合には、其  
迫状態はずつとひどく、併ふ結果は重大であつた。この場合、爆發が中  
國軍隊よりの發砲で始まつた事を亦記憶せねばならぬ。

滿鐵沿線に散在する我軍隊が、司令部より命令が来ない前に執つた敏速  
な行動は、相互の猜疑が如何に深くなつてゐるか、緊迫さが如何程であ  
るか、又日本の軍隊及び在留日本人が、重大な危険に曝されてゐるかを  
認識しない人々には、驚く可き事だと思はれるかも知れない。他の組織  
化された軍隊の如く、日本の軍隊も必ずや萬一に備へて居つたに相違な  
い。外國の領土に、又はその近隣に駐屯してゐる場合、殊に屢々事が起  
されて敏速な行動がどうしても必要となつて來てゐる場合、軍といふも  
のは、考へに考へ抜いた非常方策を立てて居らねばならない。日本軍は  
之を持つてゐた。非常方策を準備して居らないと、明かに任務懈怠であ  
つたであらう。何故かならば我軍はその數一萬四百に過ぎず、飛行機を  
有し充分武器の貯へある中國第一と認められてゐる、兵力廿倍の軍に取  
巻かれて居つたのであるから、日本軍は、壓倒されるのを防ぐ爲めに、

一つの方策を持たねばならなかつた、而して一度警報が出た場合には、その行動は殆ど自主的であつた。報告に云つてある通り、事實それは迅速且正確に實施された、正しく然りであつた。

九月十八十九日の事件を扱つて、委員會はその夜の日本軍の軍事行動は正當防衛の手段と認むるを得ずと云つてゐる。我々は之に同意する事は出来ない。

一九廿八年六月廿三日に出した國務長官ケロツグ氏の覺書にある、正當防衛權に關する章句は下の如くである。

「(一)自己防衛。米國の不戰條約草案には、如何なる遣り方でても、防衛權を制限したり損ふ事は更に述べてない。その權利は、各獨立國が自然に持つてゐるものであつて、總ての條約中に明記されてない。各國家は、何時もその領土の攻撃又は侵略されるのを防ぐのは、自由であつて、條約の條項に拘はらない、而して各國は自己だけで、自衛上狀態が戰爭せねばならぬか否か決める資格がある。」  
その條約の批准された當時、米國上院が採擇した決議は次の通り也



べてある。

「自衛権の行使は、之を行使する國家の領土支配權の範圍を超えて、その效力を及ぼすかも知れず、又屢々及ぼしてゐるといふ事は、分り切つた事である。」

又オースティン・チエムバレン卿が一九廿八年五月十九日及び七月十八日に出した手紙を引用しよう。

第一は言つてゐる。

「今衆議院草案の第一條の語句の使ひ方を研究した後、英國政府は、その字句が、一國が自己防衛をせざるを得ない行動を除外してゐるとは思はない。ケロッグ氏は、予が上に参照した演説中で、自衛権は奪ふべからざるものと認める、といふ事を明かにして居つた、而して英國政府に關しては、本文中に何等附加する必要なし云々と」思考し履い。

一〇、國策の具としての戦争の放棄に關する第一條の用語は世界の取る地方には其の地方の平和と保全が吾々平和と安全に對する特別且重要な影響を有せしむるものゝあることを閣下に御注意申上ぐることを望ましくするものである。陛下の政府は之等の地方との衝突を忍ぶことの出来ないことを過去に於て明にする爲に苦心して來た攻撃に對する之等地方の保護は英帝國に對し自己防衛の手段を取ることである。英國に於ける陛下の政府は之に關し自國の行動の自由を害しないと言ふ明瞭なる了解の下に新條約を容認することは無論のことであるとせねばならない。米國政府は比較し知べき利害關係を有して居て之を一外強が看視することは非友誼的行爲と看做すことを宣言して居るのである。それ故陛下の政府は自己の立場を明にするに當つては米國政府の意志と意味を表明して居ることを信じて居る」

オーステン、チエンバーレン氏の第二の答辯は左の如く述べて居る「自分は四月二十九日ケロツグ氏の爲した演説に表明せる同氏の意



見に全然一致して居る。其の意見と言ふのは其の提案せられた條、其の意見は自己防衛の權利を何等制限し又は害するものに非ず、又各該國は如何なる事情が自衛のための戦争を必要とする自己防衛の爲めを決定することが出来るとの同氏の意見にも一致するものなり。同氏の意見は一九二九年七月十四日の回答に於て佛國政府は獨逸政府の如し其の同意と同様の見解を發表せり。

之等の通知を受けた日本政府も亦「米國の提案は獨立國家に自己防衛の權利を否認するが如き何物をも含んで居ないものと了解する」とし、一九二八年五月二十六日附の米國大使への書翰に強調することゝ失念しなかつた。

之等の明瞭なる留保にも拘はらず又其の當時吾々の利益、吾々の國民及軍隊に對し行はれて居る組織的の敵意に鑑み本件に關しては自他共に許す裁判官たる日本政府は自國軍隊の行動はパリ條約が如何なる國にも敢て問題とせず又は否認するが如きことのなほど明瞭に認むる權利たる自衛の行爲なりと解して居る。

「滿洲事件を何が故に吾々は國際聯盟に移牒せざるや」との質問は從來屢々尋問せられたる問題である。其の回答は簡單に言へば先づ第一に日本の國民感情は滿洲問題に於て外部の干涉を許さなかつたからである。第二には若し吾々が事件を國際聯盟に移牒したとすれば滿洲餘人を含む日本國民の立場が常に聯盟手續に起り勝ちを遲延の爲非常に害せられたに違ひなかつたからである。第三には日本人と西洋人との間に必然的状態が異つて居るからである。即ち西洋人は重能が重大とならない内に論議し始むるも日本人は解決の希望を以て余りにも長く主張するのである。第四には圖らずも決裂點に達する時は事件は事件本來の道を辿るのである。

滿洲に關しては吾々が會議に提出した意見書は委員會の報告とは本質的に異つて居る。吾々は滿洲は全然支那の一部なりとの主張に反對するものである。滿洲は明瞭に而も殆んど専ら現世紀の初期迄滿洲の王朝所屬直轄領或は個人の土地であつた、而して支那の如何なる政府も之を管理して居なかつたのであつて必要の生じた時にのみ指導者は



支那政府と結合することを適當として居たのである。吾々は意見替に於て多少詳細にこの點を論じておいた。

共和政治の全期間中滿洲を統治して居た張作霖及張學良は全然彼等の意志及利益よりして支那の一點派又は他の一派とは獨立し或は之に結合せしも支那本土の如何なる權力も彼等を引退する立場になかつたのである。

吾に功名を興ふるものである。然し之等の種々なる地方的運動は觀迎の期待を徵候なりと言はずして何であらうか。若し其の運動は然らずとも、少くとも張勳良政治の消滅に依り満足と安心の徵候である。

外務大臣幣原男爵及陸軍大臣南大將は九月二十六日訓電を發し滿洲に於て新政治的秩序建設の爲めあれつつある階級の計畫に日本の官人、官吏其の他の日本人の關與することを禁止せり。

新政府に對し最も自然論にして且合理的な行政長官に如何なる人物を求むべきや、之の人物は滿洲の世襲統治者の正當なる後継者たることは否定し得るであらうか。又北支那に滿洲主權の復原に付多額の希望と運動があつたことが發聞せられ得るであらうか、更に前皇帝の立派帝位への復古に付種々なる計畫があつたのである。そして一時短期間彼は現實に北京に於て復位した。

吾々意見書は更に詳細が述べられてゐる。委員會は張勳良一派の聲望及聲望を滿洲國官市及支援者のそれよりも優先的に受入れを提議得られた様子なるも吾々は之を遺憾とする。



吾々は滿洲を以前の狀態に復歸せしむることは不満足なる解決なり  
 ざるを委員會の意見に全然一致するものである。然れども吾々は一現  
 在の政体の維持及承認は又不満足なりとする意見には全然一致して居  
 るものではない吾々は滿洲國の建國は可能なる唯一の解決策なりと思  
 料する。日本政府が此の新國家に正式の承認を與へ輔國の相互保護同  
 盟條約を締結したのも此の見解と信心に従つたものである。一  
 吾々が右何れかの解決策を單に考慮することは全極真情勢を重大なる  
 混亂に導く可能性があるのである。それは滿洲國政府及其の國民の間  
 に存在する信頼の念を直に動搖せしむる様一層支那の活動を促すこと  
 となる。故に吾々は斯かる考慮をめぐらすことは出來ないのである。  
 滿洲の獨力運動の眞否問題が委員會に於て取上げられた。委員會の報  
 告書は「日本に於て新政治運動に直接關與して居た官吏並に現役及退  
 役の軍人の一團が滿洲國の獨立を工作し編成し且行つた」と綴じて居  
 る。

其の報告書の載する所は正確なものに非ず。新國家の建設は日本人の

發意に依つたものではなくて張の禍祥より脱せんとする國民の明瞭なる希望より出でたものである。報告書が一部示す如くそれは恐るべき統治であり國民の殘忍なる壓迫であつた。それ故之を救済する爲此の機會を得へることは國民に取り當然の事であつた。之の希望が多年前「國境を保存せよ而して吾々に平和を與へよ」を意味する「報清安民なる叫を上げしめ或は西洋流の「滿洲人の爲の滿洲」を使用する様にせしめたのは歴史の事實である。之の運動は決して慶の作り事ではない。其の指導者は全く知名にして非常なる名聲家であつた。一層僞越なる二人の人物は張政府の官吏であつたが兩人共宣事君主（張一の大勅）征伐計畫に賛歩する僞辭職の巨むなきに至つたのである。九月十八日以後自治指導廳と稱する役所の創立者となつたのは張の前顧問の一人なる干仲漢であつた又漢王の慘殺の地にして清朝直轄領たる滿洲には漢王廟復辟運動があつた。之の運動は支那共和國と同程度に古いものであつた。報告書は九月十八日の事變以前には獨立の觀念は存在して居なかつたと言へて居る。委員會は本問題に關し提供せられ



たる諸情報は之を看視した事である。東洋に於ける之等の運動に關係する底流の何物かを看破することは西洋人には正に困難であるが私は信ずる。

少し考へた丈けども委員會の推定には誤りあることが判明する。

奉天地方の治安維持委員會は早くも一九三一年九月二十四日に設立せられ、九月二十六日獨立計畫の聲明を發表した。其の同日謝爾大將は吉林省の獨立を宣言した。

二十七日吉林省治安維持の爲委員會が成立せられた。十月一日張海鵬大將は遼東の獨立を布告した。十月十七日遼寧警備軍司令官于芷山大將は其の獨立を宣言し前滿洲皇帝を首領とする滿蒙國家の建設を要求した。九月十八日の事變の僅か三週間以内に餘り好もしからず且つ不必然さ稱せらるる比較的少數の日本人官吏が滿洲國を産出し、其の國の信心を轉換し、舊時代に反抗せしむることが出来るが想像し得るであらうか。それは吾々に取つては余りにもお世辭の甚だしいものと云ふべきである。それは吾々が所有して居ない説得の技術の才能に對し吾

辯護側書類第一三一號

或ル諸點ニ於テハ報告書ハ支那本國ニ對シ希望ヲ示シ滿洲國ニ對シテハソノ  
反對ヲ表明シタ。シカシ吾々ノ意見モ支那本國ニ對スルカ、ル期待ヲ覆スモノ  
デアル。滿洲國政府ハ建國以來僅カ十一ヶ月ヲ經過シタバカリデアルガ既ニ  
民政ヲ施イテヤル。之ハ二十年度滿洲五朝ノ瓦解シテ以來始メテ施カレタ民  
政デアル。

滿洲ニ於ケル日本軍ノ存在ナクシテハ新政府ノ建設ハ困難デアツタニ違ナイ  
コトハ事實デアアルガ同時ニ然ラバ國民政府ト雖モ武器、人及金ニ關スル外國  
ノ援助ヲシニ之ヲ育京ニ建設デキタデアロウカトノ設問ニ成リ立ツ譯デア  
ル。吾々モ亦吾々ノ意見書ニ於テ滿洲國ノ發展ニ關シ多少維護シテキタ、支那ニ  
於ケル發展ノ緩慢ヲノニ比ベルト滿洲國ノ發展ハ驚嘆スベキデアル。尤ニツ  
キ私ハ最も效果的ナ一事實ヲ證左トシテ引證スルガデ充分デアラウ。即チ  
中央銀行發行ノ紙幣ノ價值デアアル。委員會ノ報告書デハ銀行ガ果シテ之ニ成  
功スルヤ否ヤニ關シ疑問ヲ表示シタルノデアアル、然ルニ事實ハ中央銀行ノ  
紙幣ノ價值ハ既ニ銀貨ノ表示價格ヲ上廻ル様ニナツタ。カ、ル事實ハ永イ間



ノ張家治下ノ滿洲ノ歴史ノ上ニ書テナイコトデアル。張作霖ガカツテ其ノ紙幣ノ平價維持ヲ爲シ命令ヲ以テ立チドコロニ數人ノ支那實業家ノ帥首ヲ致テ誠ミタニカ、ワラズ成功シナカツタノニ反シ、現政府發行ノ紙幣ハ既述ノ如ク既ニ額面以上ノ價值ヲ保持スルニ至テアル。私ハコノ事實ハ現政府ノ安定性ト國民ノ現政府ニ對スル信頼異常ナル證據ニ他ナラズト主張シタイノデアル。報紙書ハ又豫算問題ニ關シテ辯論ヲ述ベテアル然シコノ問題モ事實ガ證明シテアル通り到底解決ケルニ足ル心配ノ起リ得ベキ餘地ノ無い問題デアアル。即チ滿洲國財政部ノ報告ニ照ツテミテモ明白デアアル。尙コ、ニ附加シ度イノハ滿洲ハ十ヶ年以上ニ亘リ區區萬圓乃至數百萬圓ノ輸出超過ノ好況ニアルトデアアル。

土曜、兩帥ノ未ダ完全ニ決定サレテヤナイコトハ事實デアアル。各地ニ散在セル舊統治者ノ軍隊、殘存勢力ガ舊武裝ノマ、新政府並ニ日本軍ニ反抗シテキル。匪賊ハ滿洲ニ於テハ數十年コノ方一ツノ生活手段ト化シ職業化シテ來テキル。故ニ吾々ガ滿洲國軍ト協力シテ數ヶ月ヤ一ヶ年位デ之ヲ鎮壓シテシモウコトハ廣漠ナ國土ニ於テハ到底果シ得ナイノデアアル。

今日ノ運命ハ成程度支那本國カヲ明白ナ目的ノ爲ニ援助サレテヤル、コノ事實ハ殆ド疑フ餘地ガナイ即チ歐戰國ニ對スル不滿ヲ表示セシガ爲メデア同時ニ又支那ニ於テハ戰爭泥濘ノ申譯ノ爲メ並ニ努力ガ拂ハレテヤルノデアハ滿洲ニ起ツタ事件ニ際シ日本ニ責任ヲ負ハシメルコトハ正レクナイ。吾々ハ決シテ今度ノ變革ヲ求メテヤルノゾハナカヤ。若レ支那ガ全体トシテ否滿洲バツテ適當ニ統治サレ且ツ日本人ノ利益、生命ガ放棄ノ侵奪行爲カヲ保證セシテイタナラバ何等ノ變革モ起ラナカワデアレヤト思フ。吾々ハ自衛ノ爲メ自發的ニ行動シタノデアアル。ソレテ吾々が行動ヲ起スヤ獨立運動ハ自發的ニ進展シタノデアアル。

コ、ニ「ナヴァリー」事件ヲ引用スルノモ強チ不適當デハナイト思ハレル。何トナレバコノ事件ニ於テ關係諸國間ニ紛爭ヲ起サウトスル意圖ガ殆ドナク、ソノ中ノ一點ノ如キハコノ事件「不幸ナ事件」ト稱シタ程ダツタカラデアアル。

埃及ノ軍隊ヲ希臘ニ於ケル反亂ヲ鎮壓シントシタ土其古ヲ援ケンガ爲メニヤツテ來タ。然レ埃及軍ハソノ援助ヲ飽クマデ阻止セムトスル英佛露ノ艦隊ト直面スルニ至



ツタ。ソノ結果埃及ノ艦隊ハ退却セラレ土耳其ノ希望ハ達サレ希臘ノ  
獨立ガ承認サレルニ到タノデアル。然カモ後端ハ自衛ニ迫リナイ一單ニ  
然ノ射撃ガ端緒トナツタニ過ギナイ。ソノ事實ハ自衛手段ノ及ブ範  
圍ヲ限定スルコトノ如何ニ困難ナルカラ説明スルニタルモノデアル。  
昔々ハ又一九一六年及一九一七年ニ合衆國ガ當時ノ「メキシコ」政府  
ガ合衆國民ノ生命ヲ保護スル能力ナシトノ理由ノモトニ派遣シタ遠征軍  
ノコトヲ想起スルモ差支ナイト思フ。而シテ事件ニ於テハ當局者自身カ  
現行ニ排日行爲ヲ爲シタルノデアル。從テ吾々ハ所ル行爲ノ結果ニ對シ  
テ責任ヲ負フベキモノデハナイ。文部及ビ張作霖獨立政權ニ於テ責任ヲ  
負擔シナクレバナラヌ。滿洲ノ事件ハ彼等ノ行爲デアツテ吾々ノ行爲デ  
ハナイ。然カモ事件ハ吾々ガ屢々且ツ強硬ナ警告ヲ發シタニカ、ワラズ  
遂行サレタモノデアル。

吾々ハ聯盟規約ヲ破ツタコトヲナケレバ九ヶ國條約ヲ無視ヲヤズマタ巴里條約ニ違反シタコトヲナイ。

私ハ理事會ニ對シ、日本ガ諸外國ト交通ヤンガ爲メニナシタ開國八十年來ノ歴史ヲ御檢討願度イト申上グタイ。三百年ノ間、世界ノ何レノ國家ニ於テモ例ノ無イ長イ期間、吾々ハ且テ外國ト戰端ヲ開イタマツタガ爲メニ其後ニ到テ二、三ノ戰爭ニ於テ吾々ハ他國ノ脅威カラ吾々自身ヲ安全ニ守ラムトセル以外何ヲ求メタデアロウカ。然ルニ一方支那ニ於テハソノ國內情勢ガ如何ニ長ク世界平和ヲ脅威シツツアルコトガ尙又今後イツマデカ、ル情勢ガ繼續ヤントスルコトカ。

私ハ理事會ニ對シ少々ノ御辛抱ヲ御願スル。若シ西歐諸國ガ支那ニ對シテ與ヘラレタ程ノ雅量アル寛容ノホンノ一片デモ吾々ニ與ヘラレルナラバ吾々ハ感謝シテ之ヲ受ケルデアリマヤウ、我國ノ政策、希望、終局ノ目的トスルトコロハ平和ノ維持デアル、吾々ハ如何ナル國家ニ對シテモ、戰爭ヲ欲シナイ。



吾々ハ之以上領土ヲ欲求シナイ。吾々ハ侵略者デハナイ。吾々ハ偉大ナル隣國ノ福祉ヲ心カラ熱意ヲ以テ希願シテオル。

數十年ニ亘リ日本ノ諸政策ハ極東ニ於ケル安定的且ツ防衛的勢力トナツテ來タノニ反シ、支那ノ不幸ナル國內情勢ハ極東ヲ危險ニ陷ラシムトシタ。ソレ故ニ若シ西歐諸國ガ吾々ヲ反對ノ意味ヲ以テ糾彈ヤントスルナラバ日本國民ハ西歐諸國ノ斯ル態度ヲ諒解スルニ苦ムニ相異ナイ。

最終ニ理事長閣下ニ對シ、日本政府ト日本代表ニ代ツテ、御苦勞多キ旅行ト吾々ノ心ヨリ尊重スル有能ナル御仕事ヲ果サレタ「リットル」神並ニ他ノ著明ナル調査委員各位ニ對シテ重ネテ深甚ナル感謝ノ意ヲ表スルコトヲコトニ御許シアラムコトヲ希フ次第デアル。